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Lessons and Morals Between the 1982 Invasion and Today...

Lessons and Morals Between the 1982 Invasion and Today...
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By Charles Abi Nader

Apart from the reality of the objectives that established for the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and overlapped between the hidden and the declared ones, we recall the most sensitive time in the Lebanese history, during which “Israel” expanded its occupation to the capital Beirut, in addition to large parts of the south, Beqaa and Mount Lebanon. On May 25, 2000, the enemy retreated and withdrew gradually, in an almost complete way, from all the occupied lands, except for Shebaa Farms and part of the Ghajar village, claiming that it had been taken away from Syrian soldiers stationed there when it invaded the Lebanese territory, to find out that it needs it for security, military, and geographic support for its current occupation of the Syrian Golan.

There is no doubt that the actual objectives of ‘Israel's’ invasion relate primarily to its expansionist ambitions, which serve its strategy of occupying as much Arab territory as possible and of benefiting from the largest possible amount of wealth. In addition to this is the political objective, for which it has been working hard till today, concerning the imposition of acquiescence agreements with all Arab States, which is called “peace agreements.” Lebanon has always been included in this strategy and has always been a permanent scheme for an agreement, hoping for a ‘peace’ treaty with them.

Taking into account the ‘Israeli’ claim about its objective of the invasion, which it considered at that time "ending the military and political influence of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon," and the attempted murder of its ambassador in London at the time by groups of Palestinian resistance, which is considered as a direct cause of the invasion; if we link the invasion with the phases and details of the military operations that have accompanied it, starting with its entry and expansion into the coast, mountains and Beqaa, all the way to Beirut and the circumstances and facts of the confrontations in it, we can deduce more than one point and more than one equation. We can also draw lessons and morals, which we strongly need as the core of the doctrine of confrontation, methodology and resistance, which must characterize the course of our historical struggle against this enemy.

The Cairo Agreement, which initiated Palestinian action against the enemy from Lebanon, marked the beginning of the deviation of the Lebanese State towards the wrong strategy of renouncing a right and a sacred sovereign duty. Limiting the resistance to Palestinian armed groups, without the Lebanese Authority, its entire military, security and official apparatus, was the first fatal mistake that caused the calamities and tragedies that followed, and this non-commitment of the divided authority back then, contributed to the preparation of the invasion.

 At the time, if there was an official commitment to resist the aggression of "Israel", as an enemy with all its content, duties, obligations and actions, and if the government supported the resistance against the occupation and accepted the resisting citizens in their mission, the regional and international position would have been obliged not to justify the ‘Israeli’ invasion. As for the military position, supported by the official authority, all citizens and the resistance would have been stronger and more consistent than that of a reluctant and divided position, with which we confronted the enemy when it invaded Lebanon.

Today, we can say that the situation has changed in a reasonable way. The commitment of the official political authority to resist the enemy has formed and constituted a powerful basic fulcrum against "Israel", which contributes to establishing a strong position in confronting the enemy with the resistance's deterrent weapons and balancing capabilities.

This was related to the official and national political dimension. As for the military dimension, there is a huge difference between our situation today and our situation during the invasion. In fact, there is a significant difference between the enemy's limited ability today to carry out an invasion or an incursion, and what it was during the invasion in 1982. Today, "Israel" has completely forgotten the days it used to invade as it wants, enter Arab lands whenever it wants, and reach any point and besiege any Arab capital. What happened during the 1982 invasion and the arrival of its units within a few days to the outskirts of Beirut and the outskirts of the Levant Road in Beqaa, without much resistance or with weak and helpless resistance, is no longer possible to take place.

The battle – [or the battles] - at the gates of Beirut, and the stability of the resistance or resistances in which they gathered to confront the enemy units, was at that time one of the foundations of the de facto organized resistance against the enemy, which has reached great cohesion, potentials and abilities today. With steady and confident pace, it was able to force the enemy to change many of the concepts of its military doctrine, and was able to change it from being the “invincible army” to become "weaker than the spider's web". The Resistance was able to create a new mindset in confronting the enemy, in which it was based on the elimination of the prevailing idea that its army was strong and insurmountable, and the establishment of a completely different idea, that defeating the enemy’s army became possible every time, everywhere and in any confrontation.

Today, it can be said that ‘Israel’ abandoned several basic concepts that were the mainstay of its military doctrine:

Air supremacy, which has, and still has, the main role in its battle, is now constrained in several directions, after the resistance was able to take away its full effectiveness by constantly reminding it of its possession of air defense systems that are reasonably capable of targeting its marches, helicopters and possibly bombers. The resistance has also been able to acquire a passive defense maneuver against hostile aviation by activating covert action, camouflage, fortification, and by increasing and expanding the deployment of tunnels, which caused the enemy to lose its winning point in battles, as opposed to its previous invasion.

Transferring the battle to the land of others was also one of the most military concepts adopted by the enemy, which provided it with safety, protection and stability on its internal front, in case of any attack it carries out. Today, this concept has become reciprocated with the advantage of transferring the battle to its territory, both through precision missiles and through marches possessed by the resistance. On the other hand, there is a great possibility today – which is well known and very worrying to the enemy - for the entry of the resistance members into the Galilee and the incursion and the implementation of special operations in the border settlements.

The ‘Israeli’ invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the siege of Beirut may carry many tragedies and painful and tragic memories, financially, humanely, morally and politically, but it remains the source from which Lebanon in general and the resistance in particular has been able to learn lessons and morals that we strongly need in this ongoing struggle with the Zionist enemy, as long as it occupies our territory and usurps our holy places.

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